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Liability Insurer Data as a Window
on Lawyers’ Professional Liability
Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff*
Using the best publicly available data on lawyers’ liability claims
and insurance—from the largest insurer of large law firms in the United
States, the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on
Professional Liability, and a summary of large claims from a leading
insurance broker—this Article reports the frequency of lawyers’ liability
claims, the distribution and cost of claims by type of practice, the
disposition of claims, and lawyers’ liability insurance premiums from the
early 1980s to 2013. Notable findings include remarkable stability over
thirty years in the distribution of claims by area of practice among both
small and large firms, a large percentage of claims (64–70%) involving de
minimis expenses (less than $1000) in the small firm market, and in the
large firm market a declining rate of “real claims” per one thousand
lawyers, a declining rate of real average gross loss per claim, and stable real
premiums per lawyer since the early 1990s. Because of data limitations,
however, these results cannot be confidently generalized. Further advances
in the understanding of lawyers’ liability and insurance will require
qualitative research.
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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers’ liability is a remarkably underexplored topic in tort and insurance
law teaching and scholarship. Products liability, medical malpractice,
environmental liability, and even the ubiquitous but hardly highbrow topics of
auto liability and workers compensation fill the pages of tort and insurance law
casebooks and law reviews.
Not so for lawyers’ liability, the liability that arises out of a breach of lawyers’
professional obligations to their clients. This is the liability risk that might be
thought to be the most real, and the liability insurance most relevant, for the
future lawyers who are our students. Yet law schools and legal scholarship scarcely
touch on lawyers’ liability, and they do so almost exclusively through the lens of
professional responsibility teaching and scholarship, where it receives decidedly
different treatment than it would in a torts and insurance context.1 Among other
differences, liability insurance is almost never mentioned in professional
responsibility casebooks, and discussions of lawyers’ liability typically appear only
in a short section on lawyer competence.2
This situation may be about to change because law-and-society scholars have
turned their attention to lawyers’ liability.3 In typical law-and-society fashion, this
research will focus more on the law in action than the law on the books. Liability
law in action almost always intersects with liability insurance, even when that
intersection comes in the form of the absence of, or gaps in, liability insurance.4
While there certainly are gaps, especially for solo practitioners and the smallest law

1. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS
701–47 (8th ed. 2009); THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 64–78 (10th ed. 2008); DEBORAH L. RHODE &
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 1007–20 (5th ed. 2009) (section on competence and malpractice). But
see TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 454–68
(3d ed. 2013) (using lawyer professional liability (LPL) insurance cases to teach about late notice
problems in claims made policies); SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE LAW: PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION (2d ed. 2015).
2. One professional responsibility casebook that does contain a brief section on lawyers’
liability insurance is GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 881–
84 (5th ed. 2010).
3. In addition to our project, we are aware of upcoming projects on lawyers’ liability insurance
by Bert Kritzer, Neal Vidmar, and Leslie Levin. Kritzer organized a significant gathering of law and
society legal malpractice researchers that took place at the International Institute for the Sociology of
Law in Onati, Spain in the summer of 2015.
4. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY 1 (2009) (“The tort system, not
only as it exists on paper but also how it works in practice, is a product of the insurance system, just
as the insurance system is a product of the tort system.”); Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort
Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 7 (2005)
(“Exclusions in liability insurance policies create, in effect, remote islands of tort liability that lawyers
and law professors know about, but almost no one goes to visit.”).
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firms, firms with more than a few lawyers generally have liability insurance.5 Thus,
liability insurance data have the potential to provide a window on lawyers’ liability,
at least to the extent that the data are publicly available.
This Article contributes most significantly to this developing understanding
of lawyer’s liability by compiling and analyzing the data that are publicly available.
Each of the three sources we examine is limited in significant ways, but taken
together, they provide a window on claims brought against lawyers for breaches of
their professional duties. These data also add a useful complement to, and
highlight the need for, our ongoing qualitative research on lawyers’ professional
liability (LPL) insurance.
In this Article we present data compiled from the annual reports of the
Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society insurer, commonly referred to as ALAS,
which is the insurer with the largest market share in the medium- to large-firm
LPL insurance market. Using the ALAS data, we are able to track LPL insurance
pricing and claims for ALAS members from 1983 to the present.
The ALAS data are especially well suited for tracking insurance prices over
time, because ALAS engages in unitary pricing, meaning that it charges the same
per lawyer price for each of the policies that it offers, regardless of any differences
among member firms.6 All of the policies offered each year are identical in every
respect except the limits of liability and the self-insured retention (SIR), which is
the amount of money the firm must spend on a claim before ALAS begins to pay.
While ALAS has changed the mix of policies that it has offered over time (for
example, by offering policies with higher limits and SIRs in more recent years),
there are a number of SIR/policy limit combinations that have been continuously
offered, allowing us to track the price of LPL insurance in the medium- to largefirm market for over thirty years. What we find is that, although LPL insurance
pricing reflects the liability insurance underwriting cycle,7 meaning that substantial
variations in prices over time are to be expected, LPL insurance premiums have
declined in real terms since their peak in the early 1990s.
The ALAS annual reports also contain claim-related information in a manner
that is sufficiently consistent to permit comparison over time. ALAS reports the
total number of what it calls the “real claims” reported by members per calendar
year (defined as “all claims other that those initially classified as without merit”),8
the number of real claims reported per one thousand lawyers per year, the number
5. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 2, at 881–82.
6. See, e.g., ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (2013)
[hereinafter 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT] (showing the pricing matrix for any given retention and
policy limit regardless of the firm risk). For some years ALAS charged California member firms a
different price and for many years ALAS offered some policies with high self-insured retentions only
to larger firms. See, e.g., ATTORNEY’S LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 3, 16
(1990) (noting ALAS’s hope to eliminate the twenty percent differential in California rates and the
greater than 250-member policy).
7. See Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV.
393 (2005).
8. See, e.g., 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 11.
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of claims reported per calendar year by area of practice, and the gross incurred
loss per calendar year by area of practice. What we find is that the rate of real
claims per one thousand lawyers has also declined since a peak in the 1990s.
Among our other findings, the most notable may relate to the relationship
between litigation and transactional practice area claims. Although the litigation
practice area produces the largest number of claims (about 40% of the total), the
bulk of the losses in dollar terms are attributable to transactional practice, most
significantly general corporate work, followed by banking and securities.
While ALAS members are not representative of law firms generally, ALAS
competes in the larger LPL market to retain and attract members, and law firms
do join and leave ALAS over time. As a result, the prevailing belief among
participants in the LPL insurance market is that ALAS’s overall pricing and claims
experience is sufficiently similar to that of the firms that are eligible for
membership that the ALAS experience provides a reasonably good window on the
experience of that larger group of firms.9 We concur that the data are useful in
relation to the experience of firms that are similar to those that are ALAS
members, but that there are significant sectors of the bar that are underrepresented, most significantly large law firms based in New York City, San
Francisco, and Los Angeles and the very large, truly international firms.
Although small law firms are entirely absent from the ALAS data, that
absence is of less concern because the American Bar Association’s Standing
Committee on Professional Liability has conducted a series of studies using claims
data from liability insurers that sell primarily to solo and small firms. We conduct
new analyses of these data and present them in some new ways as a complement
to our analyses of the previously unreported ALAS data.
Like the ALAS data, the ABA Standing Committee data have serious
limitations. For present purposes, the most significant is that data drawn from
liability insurance records can only reflect the experience of lawyers who buy
professional liability insurance. Many lawyers, especially solo practitioners, do not.
With that understood, the Standing Committee data allow us to track the LPL
claims experience over time along a variety of useful dimensions: the kinds of
errors that produce claims, the distribution of claims by practice area, and the
disposition of claims. What the Standing Committee data reveal is remarkable
stability over nearly thirty years of liability insurance claims, from 1983 to 2011.
Although the Standing Committee reports do not contain data on premiums, long
term stability in claims activity is likely to be associated with long-term stability in
premiums, recognizing that there can be very large short-term changes in
premiums over the course of the underwriting cycle.
We present our results as follows. We begin with a brief note on method that
explains how we obtained the qualitative information that we use to supplement
the quantitative data. We then provide a basic description of the LPL insurance
market that informs our discussion of the generalizability of what can be learned
9.

See infra Section III.B.
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from the Standing Committee and ALAS data. We then present those data and
findings. We conclude with discussion of a report prepared by Aon, the insurance
brokerage firm with the largest LPL market share, regarding the nature of the
errors that are alleged to have produced the largest publicly reported LPL
settlements and judgments.
I.

A NOTE ON METHOD

In addition to reporting results from the data from ALAS and the ABA
Standing Committee, this Article draws on our ongoing qualitative research on the
lawyers’ liability and insurance field. This qualitative research uses methods that
have become familiar to liability and insurance scholars from the work of the
sociologists H. Laurence Ross, Richard Ericson, and Carol Heimer as well as prior
work by Baker and coauthors.10 Whenever possible we provide citations to trade
literature and other public source material, but much of our information comes
from confidential, semistructured interviews with LPL market participants, along
with follow-up e-mail and phone conversations and participant observation at
lawyers’ liability and insurance conferences and programs.
To date, the interviews have focused primarily on LPL insurance structure,
pricing, and underwriting. We have interviewed fifty-one market participants: ten
from insurance brokers; seventeen from LPL insurers (two actuaries, ten
underwriters, three C-suite executives, one claims executive, and one loss
prevention specialist); fifteen from large law firms (twelve general counsels, one
chair of an insurance committee, one chair of a risk management committee, and
one chief financial officer); four reinsurance underwriters; two law firm lawyers
who are paid by LPL insurers to provide risk management advice to other law
firms; and three lawyers from outside law firms who serve as “monitoring
counsel” for LPL insurers, coordinating claims management and insurance
coverage communications between policyholders and insurers.
Because we promised confidentiality to our participants, we will not provide
information that would make them or their companies identifiable. When we do
mention specific organizations, we use either public sources or statements from
participants who have never worked in those organizations.
II. THE LPL INSURANCE MARKET
In this Part we provide an introduction to the LPL insurance market that will
inform our discussion of the generalizability of our analyses of the ABA Standing
Committee and ALAS data. In summary, the ABA Standing Committee data
appear to be based upon a sufficiently large proportion of the solo and small firm
10. See, e.g., TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT (2010);
RICHARD V. ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK, INSURANCE, AND THE
LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE (2004); H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT (1970); Tom Baker
& Thomas O. Farrish, Liability Insurance and the Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY
292 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005); Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort
Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC ’ Y REV. 275 (2001).
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market that the results of our analysis should be generalizable to insured solo and
small firm lawyers. The ALAS data are likely to be similarly generalizable to the
medium to large firms that are eligible for membership in ALAS, but not to
important segments of the large firm market that are not well represented in
ALAS: firms based in New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, and the
truly international firms with a significant U.S. presence.11
LPL insurers primarily segment the law firm market according to size and
geography. While there are differences among insurers in where they draw lines
between categories, the law firm size categories we identified are: solo
practitioners, very small firms (five or fewer lawyers), small firms (five to thirtyfive lawyers), mid-sized firms (thirty-five to two hundred lawyers), large firms
(two hundred or more lawyers), and mega international firms.12 For present
purposes we draw our main line at thirty-five lawyers, the minimum size for
becoming a member of ALAS. There are important subcategories on both sides of
that line. We draw the line there, because when selling to a firm with fewer than
thirty-five lawyers insurers sell LPL policies without significant, if any,
individuation between insureds beyond the insureds’ areas of practice. As one
Executive told us, below thirty-five lawyers “you have to underwrite by class in
practice areas. There can’t really be any insight into an individual firm. You just
11. ALAS insures only one of the eight firms described as “international” in the AmLaw 100
(Mayer Brown), as compared to six of the twenty-two firms with more than a thousand lawyers
( Jones Day, K&L Gates, Kirkland & Ellis, Mayer Brown, Morgan Lewis & Bockius, and Ropes &
Gray). Compare Special Report, The AmLaw 100 2013, AM. LAW., May 2013, with 2013 ALAS ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 6, at 79–83. Eighteen of the AmLaw 100 are firms that are based in New York
City. See Special Report, supra, at 141. Five of the AmLaw 100 are firms that are based in Palo Alto or
Los Angeles. Id.
12. See e.g., Telephone Interview with Broker 3 (Sept. 28, 2013); Telephone Interview with
Broker 4 (Oct. 16, 2013).
Broker 3:
A lot of Bar Association programs or other insurers offering insurance to smaller law firms
are typically in the solo attorney up to twenty-, twenty-five-, thirty-attorney range . . . . You
talk to six people you’ll get, I don’t know, twelve to eighteen answers in terms of what
middle market is. Middle market generally is 25 to 100, 25 to 150 attorneys. Some people
would say it’s twenty-five to seventy-five attorneys . . . . Certainly those folks look to add
attorneys, but they’re much different than when you get to the 175, 250-attorney firm on
up. Then when you get to that next size there’s a large firm and then there’s the mega-firm
or the international firm. In the middle of that some people will talk about regional firms
where you’ll have some firms that are just gonna focus on the Southeast. They’re not too
worried about Chicago or L.A. or wherever else. I don’t know if that’s helpful, but there’s
not really one clear-cut way of anybody really defining firms. Even if you walk up and
down our hallway and talk to people, some people would say, “Well midsized firms are
100 to 250 attorneys.” Other people would say, “Well no it’s 25 to 100.” No real right or
wrong answer when it comes to that.
Telephone Interview with Broker 3, supra.
Broker 4:
I guess mostly the industry looks at firms on a size basis. Firms are still very much judged
on the number of attorneys that they have. Everybody you speak to will have a different
cut off as to what they consider a small firm, what they consider a mid-size firm, and what
they consider a large firm. I guess from my perspective, I would consider a firm with less
than fifty attorneys to be a small firm. With 50 attorneys to 200 attorneys, 250 attorneys, I
would consider mid-size. Above 200, I think I would consider large.
Telephone Interview with Broker 4, supra.
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don’t have the time and you can’t afford it.”13 As a result, providing LPL
insurance to firms that are larger than thirty-five lawyers is a significantly different
business than providing LPL insurance to smaller firms.
A. The Solo and Small-Firm LPL Market
Close to three-quarters of lawyers in private practice in the United States
work in firms that employ fewer than twenty attorneys and nearly half of those
work in solo practice.14 The solo and small firm LPL insurance market is
segmented by geography, primarily as a result of the state-based nature of
insurance regulation and law practice. Each state bar association has its own barapproved program, and insurers active in the small firm market evaluate on a
state-by-state basis whether to enter into the competition to be the bar-approved
program, or whether to compete against that program in the market. Insurers file
rates and report their results on a state-by-state basis, which further encourages
them to conceptualize LPL markets on that basis.
Lawyers in the small firm market appear to purchase policies with fairly low
coverage limits. One insurer reported that its “average limit is somewhere in the
$1.5 or $2 million range.”15 Another reported that most of its small firm insureds
were in the “$1 million, $3 million, $5 million” range.16
Even with low limits and correspondingly low prices, insurance may not be
an integral part of every small firm and solo firm practice.17 While liability

13. Telephone Interview with Executive 1 (Aug. 16, 2013). The full quote from Executive 1 in
context is below:
You’ll hear different formulations, but quite simply, the sort of thirty-five and up is still
a—and that I believe is still ALAS’s level. Below thirty-five . . . you have to underwrite by
class in practice areas. There can’t really be any insight into an individual firm. You just
don’t have the time and you can’t afford it. I would say that there’s probably tranches
within that world, and the most significant, interestingly, is probably between 35 and 200
lawyers. You’re really thinking about what most people would still call a midsized law firm.
They’re typically going to be—they might be in multiple locations, but they’re not going to
be huge and international. There are, by the way, going to be exceptions, like Wachtell
Lipton to this, but I’ll leave them aside, but most firms, until they crack 200, don’t have
some of the problems that you would equate with a Davis Polk or a White & Case or a
Covington & Burling. At 200 and up is a class unto itself. Then there’s a point at which—
and the number of attorneys becomes less important—then you get up till then you get to
a point where you start talking about international mega firms. Increasingly, they are now
combinations of UK and US firms, or they just built up their own international practices
to the extent that it’s hard to tell where the center of gravity is.
Id.
14. Based on the most recent data obtained by the ABA, 75% of lawyers work in private practice.
See CLARA N. CARSON & JEEYOON PARK, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL
PROFESSION IN 2005 (Am. Bar Found. 2005) tbl.II.B, at 9, tbl.II.C., at 10. Of those, 73.9% work in firms
employing fewer than 20 lawyers—48.6% work in solo firms, 13.5% work in firms with two to five lawyers,
6.3% work in firms with six to ten lawyers, and 5.5% work in firms with eleven to twenty lawyers. See id.
tbl.II.C, at 10. Given recent trends in large firm hiring, these numbers may, in fact, understate the number of
lawyers working in small firms.
15. Telephone Interview with CEO 1 (Nov. 16, 2013).
16. Telephone Interview with Underwriter 2 (Oct. 15, 2013).
17. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 2, at 881–82 (“[I]t is estimated that at least fifty percent of
solo and small-firm lawyers have no liability insurance.”).
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insurance is a de facto cost of business for large firms, solo attorneys and very
small firms have to make difficult choices about coverage in a marketplace with
thin margins.18 Even with fairly low rates for coverage, some firms may choose to
go bare. As one insurance executive explained:
[W]hen confronted with the prospect of just having to pay an additional
$250.00 [for $200,000 of coverage per claim,] a lot of lawyers won’t do it .
. . . [T]hat’s how thin their margins are from an operating standpoint.
Yeah, you can get it very inexpensively and again, depending upon the
economic times and what’s going on in the industry, even that can be too
much. We don’t lose those insureds to a competitor. We lose them to
going bare.19
In other words, insurers selling insurance to solo practitioners and very small
firms face price-sensitive clients who want to pay low premiums or none at all.
Among other consequences, the large numbers of uninsured solo and very small
firm lawyers means that statistics drawn from LPL insurers present an incomplete,
and almost certainly biased, picture of lawyers professional liability. Lawyers and
firms that choose to forego LPL insurance likely differ from other lawyers and
firms in other ways as well. It is not difficult to imagine ways that those
differences might affect the liability risks faced by these lawyers and firms.
There are two main types of insurers active in the small firm LPL market:
the NABRICO (National Association of Bar Related Insurance Companies)
companies and commercial insurance companies like CNA and Travelers (in
addition to the reinsurers that support both types of companies). The commercial
insurers operate their small-firm business as part of what they call “program”
business. These programs are fairly described as “cookie cutter,” with “the same
wording for every firm,” the “same basic rate [plan],” and much smaller limits
than large firms.20 NABRICO is a network of mutual insurers and risk-retention
groups dating to the mid 1970’s liability insurance crisis that also spawned the
“bedpan mutuals” active in the medical liability insurance market.21 As a result of
the price-sensitive clients and cookie-cutter policies, it is not surprising to find
that these insurance relationships look more like auto insurance relationships than
like the relationships between large-firm LPL insurers and their clients.22 Lawyers
buy a policy off-the-shelf and hope the insurer pays if a claim arises. Insurers do
little in terms of underwriting, contract negotiation, tailoring loss prevention
advice, or pricing based on particular risk management practices.
18. Although one state requires all lawyers to carry malpractice insurance and other states
require it for those who practice as part of limited liability organizations, most states do not require
coverage. See Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers
Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1438 (2013).
19. Telephone Interview with CEO 1, supra note 15; see also Telephone Interview with Reinsurer
1 (Oct. 26, 2013) (calling the decision to go bare “arrogant” and explaining, “You’ve got a personal asset
base that—I don’t know, at the time was probably a million bucks—and you’re exposing it to one
mistake that you can easily hedge your bet against by spending $3,000”).
20. Telephone Interview with Underwriter 4 (Oct. 30, 2013).
21. ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 127.
22. See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 18, at 1446.
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Most of the NABRICO companies have contributed data to all of the ABA
Standing Committee studies, and many of the commercial insurance companies
active in the small firm market have contributed data to one or more of the ABA
Standing Committee studies.23 Thus, in light of the relative stability of the results
of the Standing Committee studies that we will present, we conclude that those
studies provide a reasonably good window on the claims experience of insured
lawyers in solo and small firm practice over the last thirty years, with the
recognition that a few of the insurers that participate in the Standing Committee
studies—most significantly CNA—also sell insurance to large law firms. The
Standing Committee studies do not indicate whether CNA and the other
participating insurers that sell to both small and large firms included their large
firm results in the data that they provided. Because of the predominance of soloand small-firm lawyers in this pool, the inclusion of some large law firms is
unlikely to affect most of the results that we present. We will indicate those results
for which the potential inclusion of claims against large firms may make a
difference.
B. The Medium- to Large-Firm LPL Market
There are three distinct types of insurance arrangements in the medium- to
large-law-firm LPL insurance market, each with significantly different approaches
to program structure and pricing: (1) ALAS, (2) three other medium- to large-lawfirm mutual insurance arrangements, and (3) the commercial insurance market. All
three differ significantly from the small firm market in both insurance program
structure and pricing. Larger law firms purchase much higher insurance limits
than small firms, working closely with brokers (unless they are purchasing
insurance exclusively from ALAS), and including more insurers on the risk.

23. The report of the initial 1985 ABA study reports that all of the NABRICO companies
participated and that of the commercial carriers active in the market, only three companies failed to
contribute meaningful data. WILLIAM H. GATES & SHEREE L. SWETIN, AM. BAR. ASS’N,
CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL MALPRACTICE
DATA CENTER, at vii–viii (1989) (identifying the three companies as American Home, The Home
Insurance Company, and Shand Morahan). The ABA studies from 1996 forward specifically list the
contributing insurers. A comparison of those lists with the membership list on the NABRICO
website reveals that only the Texas Lawyers Insurance Company has never contributed data to the
follow-up studies. The Florida Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company missed one study (2003); the
Illinois State Bar Association Mutual Insurance Company contributed only to the 2007 and 2011
studies; the Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company (California) missed the 1999 and 2003 studies; the
Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company of Kentucky and the Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company of
North Carolina each missed only the 2011 study; the Ohio Bar Liability Insurance Company missed
the 1999 study; and the Oklahoma Attorneys Mutual Insurance Company missed the 2007 study. The
other NABRICO members contributed data to all of the follow-up studies. There is much more
variation in the commercial insurers contributing to the follow up studies. CNA is the only company
that contributed to all the studies. Zurich contributed to all except the 1999 study. St. Paul
(subsequently acquired by Travelers) contributed to all except the 1996 study. The other commercial
insurers participating are a changing mix. Interestingly, ALAS contributed data to the 1996 study but
to none of the other studies.
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The Commercial Market

The commercial market is dominated by a relatively small number of carriers,
each of which is typically willing at the time of this writing to provide no more
than $10 million of aggregate coverage to any given law firm in any given year.24
Large law firms typically purchase limits vastly beyond what a single carrier wants
to (or can) provide. The largest firms may seek insurance programs with total
limits of up to $300 or even $400 million; mid-sized firms typically do not
purchase as much insurance, but still may request limits beyond what any single
carrier will offer.25
Commercial large law firm insurance arrangements typically consist of layers
of “quota share” insurance policies, collectively referred to as a “syndicate.”26 In a
quota share, a lead insurer and two or more additional insurers provide up to $50
million coverage (currently composed of no more than $10 million from any
single insurer). Under this arrangement, each insurer in the syndicate is responsible
for paying any losses according to a preset percentage. For example, if there are
24. Telephone Interview with Broker 2 (Sept. 24, 2013):
Most insurers will only—on large law firms or at any law firm, they’ll write $10 million
part of a larger program. There’s a few insurers—there’s a few global insurers that will
write $20 to $35 million. Rarely do they do that, but they have the ability to do that.
25. See Telephone Interview with Underwriter 1 (Sept. 27, 2013) (“There are quite a few firms
who have $200–300 millions in limits, but most of them a hundred or under.”). One insurance
executive claimed that the top of the AmLaw 250 “buy 300 million in limits,” but “except for the very
top handful, everyone [else in the AmLaw 250] is under 100 million.” Telephone Interview with
Executive 2 (Oct. 31, 2013).
26. Telephone Interview with Broker 6 (Dec. 6, 2013):
R: Larger firms, sophisticated firms, prefer the syndicated placement, meaning you take
capacity from various insurers and you put them together. You’re basically stretching the
capacity so that, when you’ve got a claim, you’ve got the ability to have a comfortable
primary. The people you’re dealing with when you pay the loss experience are the same
people you’re dealing with when you’re paying the defense cost. They would rather have
the capacity stretched a little bit differently. If somebody has a business plan that changes,
they move off risk, and you just replace them. It’s not like you’re changing, wholesale
changing a relationship. These insurers that I mentioned, some of them will write pure,
discreet blocks of capacity, say ten million, or they’ll offer it on a syndicated basis.
Q: Is syndicated the same as quota share?
R: Yeah, exactly, quota share.
Telephone Interview with Executive 2, supra note 25:
Almost all our policies are quota share. There are carriers out there . . . [who] would write a
primary ten million-dollar policy. If we offered you a ten million-dollar policy, we would
take fifty percent of it, five million, and then we would quota share with another carrier.
We are more comfortable with very large firms, and large firms take twenty-five, fifty
million in limits for their primary limits. Then we take a piece of those limits. The most
we’ll put on any primary is ten million. That’s not the first ten, that’s ten part of twentyfive, or ten part of thirty-five. That’s how we quota share our business.
Telephone Interview with Underwriter 1, supra note 25:
[Towers are] built either in primary fifties or primary thirties, and they’re all quota share.
Q: Oh, that’s interesting, so the primary layer is quota share?
R: The whole program is often quota share. Most of those large programs will have a
starting primary limit that’s relatively large that will be shared by three, four, five carriers.
Then the first excess layer will be frequently another layer of—you may have a [primary
of] fifty and excess fifty, again, shared by five, six, seven, eight carriers. What that’s
allowed people to do is, aside from there all the excess players, it allows me to do—if I
really like the firm, I’ll put up my whole ten on the primary, but I can also put five up on
the primary and five up on the excess.
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five insurers who have each contributed $10 million of coverage in a $50 million
quota share and the insured suffers a $25 million loss, each insurer would pay $5
million.27 This stands in contrast to a tower with layers of coverage sold by
individual insurance companies, each of which pays only once the underlying
insurance is exhausted. The lead insurer in the syndicate is responsible for setting
the price, agreeing on the policy form, and managing the claim.28 To get to $300
million or so of coverage, law firms must assemble multiple layers of insurers
sharing a quota share risk in each layer. Typical of the large commercial insurance
market more broadly, premiums for large law firm commercial insurance
arrangements are individually negotiated and explicitly risk rated.29
Assembling the tower can be difficult and time consuming. Thus, brokers
are key actors in the large-firm commercial LPL insurance market, assembling a
number of carriers to meet the needs of the insured. Even for firms with relatively
small towers, the LPL business requires specialized expertise and long-term
relationships.30 Brokers have traditionally had a comparative advantage in building
and maintaining those relationships.
27. Telephone Interview with Broker 4, supra note 12:
Generally speaking, if you quota share you spread your risk in a more favorable way.
Here’s the simplistic model. If a firm is buying ten million dollars, and that ten million
dollars is provided by one insurer, if that firm has a three million-dollar claim, that insurer
pays all those three million dollars. If that ten million is provided on a quota share basis by
three different carriers, which equal shares of the ten million, and there’s a three-million
dollar loss, they only pay a million. They pay a third of the three.
28. Telephone Interview with Executive 3 (Dec. 20, 2013):
Q: So do carriers set their rates for being a part of that quota share independently, or do
they all sort of get together and decide, or one person decides and they all follow?
R: Yeah, one person decides, so the broker will determine upfront. They’ll approach
somebody and ask for a lead indication, and say, “What would you, how much capacity
would you put out, and what would your quote be, and what would the terms be for this
policy?” If they get a quote back from a person that they want to have the lead, and if they
think that that’s acceptable to them and acceptable to their client, and then sellable to the
rest of the market, something that they can get supported, they’ll take those terms and then
they’ll come to the rest of the market. They’ll say, “Okay, here’s what CNA’s terms are on
this firm, can you support those, and we’re looking for you to put up seven and a half
million dollars of capacity or five or ten million,” whatever they’re looking for from us. At
that point, my thing is either yes or no. Now, if they’ve placed forty million dollars and
they need just ten million dollars plugged, my answer is basically yes or no because they
can probably plug the last ten if they’ve got eighty percent of it placed already. If they
come to me second, like, CNA put out a quote, here’s what the quote is, can you support
that. If I come back and say, “Yeah, I’m sorry, I just can’t. I can’t get to that price.” If I’m
just the second guy they’ve come to, they’ll likely come back to me and say, “Okay, what
could you support?” All right, look, I can’t do it for a million one. I’m really at a million
two fifty, and here’s why I think it needs to be at that rate blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. Or, I
don’t like the retention treatment; I think the retention needs to move higher. Then, they’ll
normally try to go back to the lead, and say, “Look, here’s where we need this to be. This is
what we think we can get supported,” so they’ll bump the rates up, and then they’ll go to
the third guy and the fourth guy.
29. See id.
30. Telephone Interview with Reinsurer 1, supra note 19:
If [a law firm is] building up a tower of primary or first layer insurance and excess
insurance, a broker is helpful because one, he has access to the markets. Secondly, it’s a
whole lot of work for a law firm risk manager or someone to be doing themselves. They’re
better off renting that through the commissions they pay to a broker.
As one underwriter explained,
[A] broker can help or hurt considerably in the sense of helping the law firm prepare the
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ALAS

ALAS differs from commercial insurers in four key ways. First, ALAS offers
its member firms per-claim and aggregate LPL limits up to $75 and $150 million,31
substantially more than the $10 million aggregate LPL limit that any commercial
insurer will provide to a single law firm as of 2014. This means that ALAS
members need to go to the commercial liability insurance market only for the kind
of high-level excess insurance policies that very rarely are called upon to pay
claims. As reported in more detail below, there are only sixty-four publicly known
LPL verdicts and settlements in excess of $20 million. Of those, only twenty-eight
are $35 million or more.32 Assuming, very conservatively, that defense costs are
equal to settlement or verdict amounts even for very large claims (more likely,
defense costs gradually become a smaller percentage of the total loss as the
settlement amount rises), that means that only twenty-eight known LPL claims
would have exceeded the LPL limits that ALAS makes available to its members.
Second, ALAS historically refused to allow law firms in New York City to
join, and it was reluctant to include law firms based in California.33 As a result,
firms in New York City and California formed their own mutual insurance
organizations, described next. While ALAS appears to have significantly relaxed
these restrictions, the law firms participating in these other mutual insurance
arrangements have largely stayed put. As a result, the ALAS experience may not
reflect that of the large New York and California firms.
Third, ALAS requires its members to engage in a variety of risk management
activities and allow ALAS to manage all claims.34 Some commercial insurers
encourage firms to engage in risk management activities, including in some cases
by subsidizing the associated costs, but the activities are not a requirement.35
submission—the presentation to us, in terms of the application. They can also help in the
sense of the meeting to organize in such event that would help show the law firms
advantages and prepare them, if there’s any weak spots, to know how to respond.
Telephone Interview with Underwriter 4, supra note 20.
31. 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6.
32. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
33. See ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2001) (noting
that ALAS bylaws were changed that year to remove geographic restrictions that had previously
existed).
34. See, e.g., 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 17–20 (detailing ALAS’s loss
prevention services and claim management requirements).
35. One executive described the process for providing risk management advise to insureds:
[W]hen we’re the lead carrier, we set up a budget. Probably, for a big firm that’s paying a
million and a half or two million-dollars in premium, we’ll set up a twenty-five or thirtyfive or forty thousand-dollar risk management budget. Then what we’ll do is, we’ll talk to
the firm periodically throughout the year. We’ll ask them different things about, are there
issues that concern you? Do you feel comfortable with your conflicts? How do you feel
about client intake? Have you gone through and done a review or audit of all your
engagement letters? We’ll work with them to find out if they feel that this is something we
really need more on. Cyber risk. I wonder if we’re really protected the way we should be
from a cyber risk issue? Then we’ll go out, because there are plenty of vendors out there,
and we will go out and we will hire somebody, or we’ll set up an engagement where
someone will come in. A lot of times it’ll provide CLE, continuing legal education credit,
so that helps the attorneys in the firm. We’ll give a presentation.
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Commercial, large-law-firm LPL policies also almost always permit the law firm
to select the defense lawyer, and they give the law firm significant control over the
defense.36
Fourth, ALAS charges unitary per-lawyer premiums that differ only
according to the limit and retention of the policy.37 In other words, all ALAS
member firms are eligible to purchase any combination of retention and limit for
the same per-lawyer price regardless of the firms’ particular features or claims
history.38 This means that ALAS members with the very best claims records are
the firms that are most likely to realize lower premiums from leaving ALAS and
entering the commercial market.
It is important to note that ALAS member firms that wish to purchase
additional insurance do so in the commercial market, using commercial insurance
Telephone Interview with Executive 2, supra note 25. This is typical. Most insurers provide some risk
management advice. One reinsurer told us that he did not give carriers a lower price for providing risk
management services because he expected all carriers to do some level of risk management.
“Everybody has a hotline; everybody probably offers various ancillary-type services and things even
embedded into the policy, like you want mutual choice counsel, those types of things.” Telephone
Interview with Reinsurer 2 (May 3, 2014).
36. See Telephone Interview with Broker 6, supra note 26:
Most of the large firms will be on a surplus lines basis, and they’ll also be on an indemnity
form basis. What they mean by indemnity is that, the duty to defend the firm does not rest
with the insurer, but it rests with the insured. There’s more latitude in the way a case is
defended in an indemnity form.
As one broker stated:
The smaller firms don’t tend to get the same breadth of coverage as the larger firms, and
some of that is how claims are handled. The large firms in the U.S. have big self-insured
retentions, and want to have a certain amount of autonomy as to how they handle their
claims, and don’t want an insurer telling them how to do it. The smaller firms have much
smaller self-insured retentions, and the insurers, as a result, insist on being much more
heavily involved in the handling of the claim. You have policy wordings to reflect those
two different types of way you do your business.
Telephone Interview with Broker 9 (June 12, 2014).
37. See 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6 (showing an example of the per-lawyer
premium rates table ALAS charges).
38. In the commercial market, for example, carriers commonly rate prices based on firm size,
geography, practice area, and certainly claims history, among other things. See Telephone Interview
with Executive 2, supra note 25 (listing “head counts, location, business split,” “practice area,” and
“loss history” as the primary tools for building a premium price); see also Telephone Interview with
Broker 3, supra note 12:
Q: When you’re thinking about the rates for these firms what are the primary things you’re
looking at?
R: Head count. Lawyer’s professional liability is typically written on a head-count basis. A
100-person firm is gonna pay a much different total premium than a 500-attorney
firm. . . . There’s a lot of other pieces. The claims history is certainly important. The firm’s
risk management policies and procedures. Geography sometimes plays a role. Certain
jurisdictions insurers don’t like as much, so they’ll charge more. The areas of practice.
Patent prosecution for example is a dangerous area cuz if somebody misses the filing of a
patent at a certain date that could cause their client quite a bit of harm. Insurers would end
up and have ended up paying quite a bit of money as compared to insurance defense work
that usually comes at a lower risk. The areas of practice certainly are important.
None of this, however, plays into ALAS’s pricing structure. While ALAS reserves the right to stop
insuring its members with bad claims history, it does not do so frequently. See, e.g., 2013 ALAS
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 24 (noting that since 1992, ALAS has declined to renew only
twenty-one firms, including one in the fall of 2013).
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brokers. These brokers can and do tell ALAS members what they would be
charged for all of their LPL insurance if they left ALAS and went into the
commercial market.39 This process brings the largest ALAS members into close
contact with the commercial market at every renewal and, thus, tempers the
degree to which ALAS pricing and other terms can be less favorable to law firms
than those offered in the commercial market.40 Our senior broker respondents
claimed that the savings could be as high as 30% for many of the ALAS member
firms, though it is important to keep in mind that commercial insurers underwrite
firms individually, and such predicted savings may prove to be exaggerated if a
firm’s claims history or other factors suggest to underwriters that it is not as good
a risk as a broker believes.41
The regular contact between ALAS members and the commercial market
reinforces our conclusion that it is reasonable to generalize the ALAS experience
to much of the medium- to large-law-firm market, keeping in mind (1) the law
firm sectors that are significantly underrepresented in ALAS and (2) the
possibility that ALAS members have better claims records because of selection
effects and ALAS loss prevention and claims management.
3.

Other Large-Firm Mutuals

The third large law firm segment consists of three geographically based
mutual insurance organizations about which very little is publicly known: Bar
Assurance and Reinsurance, Ltd. (BAR), MPC Insurance, Ltd., and Attorneys
Insurance Mutual Risk Retention Group (AIM). BAR serves very large New York
City Firms. MPC members are primarily San Francisco-based very large law
firms.42 AIM serves a broader based group of California law firms with more than
39. When asked about whether his firm would consider leaving ALAS, one General Counsel
of an ALAS firm joked, “that’s a frequently asked question . . . every commercial insurer in the
western hemisphere—or actually more than the western hemisphere—is asking that question every
year.” Telephone Interview with Law Firm General Counsel 3 (May 8, 2014). He later stated, “We are
frequently approached by commercial carriers who would love to replace them if they could. It’s a
common question; it’s a question that we’re asked and we consider every year.” Id.
40. As a General Counsel of an ALAS law firm stated:
We’re very satisfied with ALAS and I think it does a terrific job not only with respect to
clients but with respect with loss prevention programs and so forth. We get approached
from time to time by insurers or brokers who make pitches and so forth. We’re very
comfortable with where we are and like I said it’s not that we don’t have significant
interaction with the commercial markets outside of ALAS, because we have a substantial
excess program and deal with and meet with those folks regularly.
Telephone Interview with Law Firm General Counsel 5 (May 29, 2014).
41. See, e.g., E-mail from Broker 8 to coauthor Tom Baker ( Jan. 4, 2015, 3:09 PM) (on file
with coauthor Tom Baker).
42. Brian McDonoguh, Jed Hurley, 30-Year McCutchen Attorney, 76, LEGALPAD ( July 9, 2009),
http://legalpad.typepad.com/my_weblog/2009/07/jed-hurley-30year-mccutchen-attorney-76.html
[https://perma.cc/E8Z4-6L7J] (providing the obituary of Jed Hurley, thirty-year McCutchen
Attorney, and identifying him as one of the founders of “MPC Insurance Ltd., a company that
provided professional liability insurance to many of San Francisco’s largest law firms”); see Thomas J.
Igoe, Jr., REED SMITH, http://www.reedsmith.com/thomas_igoe [https://perma.cc/RSV6-N8RZ]
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016) (identifying Mr. Igoe as of counsel to Reed Smith and President and
Chairman of MPC Insurance, Ltd., and reporting that MPC is “a Vermont captive insurance company
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forty-five attorneys.43 While there are substantial differences in the details of these
three organizations, all three largely function as insurance buying groups and are
managed by leading insurance brokers.44 More detailed description awaits future
work. For present purposes it is useful to think of them as mutual/commercial
hybrids that provide LPL insurance primarily for law firms that historically did not
have access to ALAS.
III. INSURER DATA ON LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
The lawyers’ liability that we are investigating and that is the subject of LPL
insurance is legal malpractice liability: liability that arises out of a breach of the
lawyers’ professional obligations to their clients. Lawyers can be sued for many
other kinds of wrongs—from automobile accidents to employment
discrimination—but those other kinds of liabilities are covered by other kinds of
insurance, such as auto liability insurance, employment-practices liability
insurance, and general liability insurance.
In this Part we report at a high level what can be known about the frequency
and extent of LPL claims based on the LPL insurer data that we have assembled.
We have three sources: (1) a series of studies conducted by the American Bar
Association Standing Committee on Lawyers’ Liability and previously published
by the ABA; (2) the annual reports of the largest insurer of medium to large law
firms, the Attorney’s Liability Assurance Society, which contain much useful data
that has never been publicly collected and analyzed and (3) a collection and
analysis of the largest publicly reported LPL settlements and verdicts compiled by
Aon, the insurance brokerage company with the largest market share in the
lawyers professional liability insurance market. All of these sources have
significant limitations. Nevertheless, taken together they provide an informative
complement to what can be learned from qualitative research.
A. The Standing Committee Studies
The most significant prior empirical research on lawyers’ liability comes
from the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers’ Liability. The Standing
Committee launched its first systematic study of lawyers’ liability in response to
the mid 1970’s liability insurance crisis (the same crisis that initiated the more
owned by 9 national and international law firms that provides professional liability insurance coverage
for more than 7,000 attorneys practicing in the United States and in many foreign jurisdictions”).
43. See California Lawyer’s Annual Professional Liability Insurance Report, CAL. L., Feb. 2010, at 28,
28–29.
44. The Business Insurance directory of alternative risk financing facilities identifies Marsh as
the manager for MPC. BI Directory of Alternative Risk Financing Facilities, BUS. INS. (Nov. 12, 2000, 12:01
AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20001112/ISSUE01/10001657
[https://perma.cc/UX2J-5RAN]. The California Lawyer listing of malpractice insurers identifies AIM
as an “Aon affiliate.” Malpractice Insurance Report, CAL. L., Feb. 2006, at 32, 32–33. Aon also serves as a
broker and manager for BAR. See E-mail from Executive 1 to both coauthors ( Jan. 5, 2015) (on file
with coauthors) (confirming that Aon’s role managing BAR is widely known among LPL insurance
professionals).
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widely known empirical research on medical malpractice).45 Working closely with
the members of NABRICO, the Standing Committee persuaded most of the
insurers operating in the LPL market at the time to fill out individual reports on
each claim opened or closed during a study period of 1980 to 1985, of which the
29,227 claims reported during the period January 1983 through September 1985
were deemed worthy of analysis.46
Unfortunately, the study made no systematic effort to determine how
representative this convenience sample was of lawyers and law firms, either by
comparing the lawyers insured by these organizations to lawyers who did not
purchase liability insurance at all or by comparing them to lawyers who are insured
by organizations that did not participate.47 To the latter point, the nonparticipating
insurance organizations include ALAS, other large law firm mutual insurance
organizations, and a number of commercial carriers that insure medium and large
firms. As a result, the data are skewed toward the solo- and small-firm market and
are unlikely to be representative of claim practices in the medium- and large-firm
market.
Nonetheless, the first Standing Committee study had an impact on the LPL
market. Imperfect as it was, it was the first effort to gather systematic evidence on
lawyers’ liability and changed underwriting practices. A senior reinsurance
underwriter who has been involved in the LPL market for more than thirty years
described the study as producing “a paradigm shift in the thinking of the industry,
from an earlier view of how to underwrite, to a more evidence-based type.”48
Starting in 1996, the Standing Committee has updated this research in tenand five-year increments, with the most recent study covering the years 2008
through 2011.49 Unfortunately, the updates use a different research method than
45. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 65 (2005) (describing the relationship
between the liability insurance underwriting cycle and empirical research on medical malpractice).
46. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL
MALPRACTICE: A STATISTICAL STUDY OF DETERMINATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS
ASSERTED AGAINST ATTORNEYS 3 (1986) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM., 1986 STATISTICAL
STUDY]; GATES & SWETIN, supra note 23, at vii.
47. A statistical study released prior to the 1989 publication reported that the Committee
undertook the following validation exercise:
Additionally, the major findings of this study were validated by examining claims from
Oregon, with legal malpractice insurance mandatory for practice in a substantive
proportion of all areas of law. [sic] Therefore, because the claims reported in Oregon come
from a substantial group of the entire population of lawyers, the analysis of those claims
should be generalizable to the lawyer population of Oregon. If the findings in this study
hold true for Oregon, then they can be generalized more defensibly to the entire
population of U.S. lawyers, even to those non-insured lawyers not included in this study.
ABA STANDING COMM., 1986 STATISTICAL STUDY, supra note 46, at 5. This kind of statement does
not appear in the 1989 report or in any of the follow up studies. See, e.g., GATES & SWETIN, supra note
23.
48. Telephone Interview with Reinsurer 1, supra note 19.
49. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., LEGAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS IN THE 1990S (1996) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM., 1990S PROFILE]; AM. BAR
ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS 1996–1999 (2000) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM., 1996–1999 PROFILE]; AM. BAR
ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE
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the original study.50 The updates are based on calendar-year summary reporting by
the participating insurers, based on their own internal records, rather than
individual claim forms. To the extent that an insurer’s internal reporting does not
match closely with the Standing Committee’s requested categorization, the
reliability of the insurer’s reports is at issue.51 Moreover, because the LPL insurers
providing the claims data have not remained consistent over the years, the results
from the studies are not directly comparable. Lastly, just as in the original study,
the participating insurers disproportionately represent solo and small firms.
Despite these limitations, the Standing Committee studies are informative.
First, they are a window into what information LPL insurers and the Standing
Committee expected to be important and reliably obtained. For each claim the
insurers recorded the number of lawyers insured by the policy (a reasonable proxy
for firm size),52 the number of years the defendant had been practicing, whether
the claim arose out of an attempt to collect a fee, whether the claim arose out of
an area of law “normal to the insured’s practice” or “not normal,” the area of law
in which the defendant was retained by the client, the major activity in which the
defendant was engaged at the time of the alleged error, “the one alleged error or
misconduct which is the most significant to the cause of the claim being made,”
the disposition of the claim (e.g., no payment, settlement, judgment), the amount
of loss expense and any claim payment, along with a few other less noteworthy
topics. With only two exceptions,53 the updates have maintained the same
categories, allowing for comparison across time subject to the data limitations
already noted.
The results of the studies are also informative. Most significantly, according
to one senior reinsurance underwriter:
Prior to that study, underwriters were, in my estimation, unduly focused
on area of practice. They would … come to conclusions like this: “Oh.
This law firm has three attorneys. They’re focused in providing legal
CLAIMS 2000–2003 (2005) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM., 2000–2003 PROFILE]; AM. BAR
ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS 2004–2007 (2008) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM., 2004–2007 PROFILE]; AM. BAR
ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS 2008–2011 (2012) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM., 2008–2011 PROFILE].
50. See ABA STANDING COMM., 2008–2011 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 3.
51. All of the updates contain cautionary language similar to the following:
This claim-by-claim reporting system proved to be cumbersome and was abandoned after
the [initial] study. The 1995 though 2011 studies are based on calendar-year summary
report forms completed by participating companies based on their own internal data. We
asked insurers to do their best in assigning their data to the established 1985 categories.
While the recent studies use the same general data categories as the 1985 study, the
categories do not always correspond to those used by participating insurers. In some
instances, the Committee had to eliminate incompatible insurer data.
See, e.g., id. As a result, the number of observations differs considerably across the Standing
Committee Studies’ data fields, with no way to assess how the missing data affect the generalizability
of the results other than to provide significant grounds for caution.
52. Of note, the categories for number of lawyers were: one, two to five, six to thirty, and
over thirty. GATES & SWETIN, supra note 23, at 508–09 (providing a copy of the reporting form).
53. The normal/not normal and the years of practice coding are not included in later studies.
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services connected with the issuance of municipal bonds. Municipal
bonds have gone into bankruptcy. Lawyers have been held responsible, in
part, for that. Therefore, I’m not gonna write areas of practice in which
law firms or areas—or law firms with heavy areas of practice in
providing legal services for municipal bonds.”
It became this idea of, if you could only steer around certain areas of
practice, you could underwrite safely. What this study showed, on a
number of levels, was that the majority of lawyers professional liability
claims had as their origin, not a failure of substantive knowledge.
Meaning the practitioner, if he spent any considerable time in a particular
area, pretty well knew what to do, mechanically, in the practice of law.
What he may not have done well was an administrative issue. He may not
have issued an engagement letter, issued a disengagement letter, run a
conflict of interest clearance, had a docket control system, had a backup
on a docket control system. It was all these administrative things where
the majority of claims, when you traced it back to the origins, not all of
them, but the majority of them, tended to lend itself to the idea that wow,
these practitioners are missing some administrative management issue, as
opposed to failing in some substantive area of law.
. . . Likewise, underwriters, as they began underwriting these law firms . . .
began incorporating some of the ideas, in that study, into their
applications, into their questionnaires, into just the casual questions
they’d ask a broker or directly to the law firm about how do you do what
you do, and focus predominately on administrative issues.
The reason was that study.54
In fact, and contrary to the recollection of this underwriter, the study found
that alleged substantive errors were just as frequent as the sum of what the
Standing Committee referred to as “administrative”55 and “client relations”
errors56 (both of which were likely subsumed in what the underwriter referred to
as “administrative issues”). Nevertheless, the fact that this senior underwriter
remembered that the study found that administrative issues were more frequent
than substantive errors only serves to emphasize how influential the administrative
error finding was. Administrative and client-relations errors occurred across the
entire spectrum of practice areas and in firms of all sizes (though more frequently,
relative to other alleged errors, in the smaller firms).57 And, perhaps,
54. Telephone Interview with Reinsurer 1, supra note 19.
55. The leading “administrative errors” are: “failure to calendar properly,” “failure to react to
calendar,” “failure to file documents where no deadline is involved,” and “procrastination in
performance of service or lack of follow up.” See infra Table 2; infra note 68.
56. The “client relations” errors are: “failure to follow client’s instructions,” “failure to obtain
client’s consent or to inform client,” “improper withdrawal from representation.” Many of these
claims would seem to fit within the reinsurance underwriter’s definition of “administrative issues.”
See infra Table 2; infra note 68.
57. See ABA STANDING COMM., 1986 STATISTICAL STUDY, supra note 46, at 21
(administrative plus client-related errors account for 44% of alleged errors in solo firms, 42% in twoto-five-lawyer firms, 42% in six-to-thirty-lawyer firms, and only 28% in thirty-or-more-lawyer firms).
See also Telephone Interview with Actuary 1 (Dec. 7, 2013):
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administrative and client-relations errors could be controlled, an important point
that led the bar and LPL insurers to begin to focus more on loss prevention.
The ABA Standing Committee study also confirmed that, as LPL insurers
already suspected, the number of claims and the size of the resulting losses
differed by practice area as well as geography. The two practice areas with the
most claims in the Standing Committee data have consistently been plaintiffs’
personal injury and real estate.58 Numbers three and four have generally been
family law and “estate, trust and probate.”59 These practice areas are all among the
most common, especially among lawyers in solo practice or small firms, so it is
not necessarily the case that these practice areas have higher rates of claims,
though insurance pricing practices suggest that they do.60 These basic elements—
practice area and geography—along with the number of lawyers and past claim
experience, remain the fundamental building blocks of solo- and small-law-firm
LPL insurance pricing today.61
In contrast to the closed-claim studies of medical malpractice claims

On the size of firm, it kind of became a little bit self-evident. When I looked at the loss
information when you side the loss information with the underwriting information.
Basically, when I matched up the size of firm with their loss data, you saw definite breaks
in the data. You saw solos—astronomical frequencies. Their frequencies were tenfold
every other law firm. Two and third man law firms, their frequency wasn’t nearly as high
as a solo, but it was pretty high. Then you got down to five to ten, and there were actually
natural breaking points in the data based upon the claim frequency, so I started there. I
didn’t see it quite as much on the severity side on the size of firm. Where I saw the more
natural breaking points for severity for the average cost of the claim, came on the area of
practice.
58. See infra Table 1.
59. Id.
60. Insurers have charged somewhat higher prices for these practice areas in the small firm
LPL market. See Telephone Interview with Underwriter 2, supra note 16 (noting that “real estate,
which is a much maligned area of practice these days within the LPL business.”). One reinsurer
explained that price when rating practice area, his firm considered whether the firm did “heavy
plaintiff work or is it real basic estate work?” Telephone Interview with Reinsurer 2, supra note 35. In
addition, his firm rated “corporate M&A, securities work, [and] intellectual property” as more risky.
One CEO also explained that practice area was a very important factor for pricing, but suggested that
the practice areas that were high risk were different than the ones identified in the ABA Standing
Committee study:
[O]ur view of the claim environment is now much more focused on area practice. Is the
law firm working in a high hazard area or not? The groupings are pretty consistent—
securities, IT, IP, entertainment—are all on the high hazard end of the equation. Things
like criminal law, insurance defense, legal aid, arbitration mediation—family law
probably—are on the less hazard end of the spectrum.
CEO1. Presumably, they know the number of lawyers practicing in these areas relative to the size of
the bar as a whole.
61. See Telephone Interview with Underwriter 3 (Oct. 22, 2013):
I think you asked a good question there and really there’s kind of three main things that I
think most carriers—and again, this is the part that our company gets nervous on when I
talk about what most carriers do. There’s three main things that most carriers would look
at when they think about underwriting law firms and those are size, services and location.
How big is it, what are the particular areas of practice that they and almost every carrier
has an area of practice grid that law firms have to fill out explaining what percentage of
either their revenues or billings come from each individual area of practice. Ours is pretty
extensive. It has sixty different classifications.
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conducted at about the same time,62 the Standing Committee study did not
attempt to evaluate the merits of the claims. Instead, the study simply reported the
outcome of the closed claims—67% were closed with no payment. Of the claims
closed with payment, only 38% (12% of all claims) followed commencement of a
suit, indicating that most paid claims were paid outside of the formal civil justice
process. Only about 4% of paid claims (1% of all claims) involved a judgment for
the plaintiff.
Figure 1 below shows the disposition of claims reported in all of the ABA
Standing Committee Studies.63 Across the thirty-year time period covered in the
studies, about 50% to 60% of claims are abandoned without payment (except for
an outlier of 33% in the 1995 study) and another 10% to 20% are adjudicated in
favor of the defendant, with the rest resulting in a payment. Of the claims resolved
with a payment, most are paid without suit and less than 10% (usually much less)
after a trial. The large percentage of paid claims settled presuit, and the lack of any
attempt on the part of the Study participants to challenge the merits of paid
claims, suggests that the Study participants thought that paid claims were
reasonably meritorious.64 This is, of course, also the conclusion of all of the welldesigned closed-claim medical malpractice studies.65
Because of the changing composition of the participating insurers, the nature
of the sample, and the change in the method of collecting the data, the Standing
Committee’s updates do not provide statistically reliable information about the
overall rate of claiming. There are progressively more claims per year in the studies
over time, which is to be expected given two things: the growth in the number of
lawyers,66 and greater participation by insurers in providing data, especially in the
most recent study. Accordingly, the only sensible way to use the Standing
Committee data is to compare the distribution of claims and disposition in
percentage terms, rather than absolute numbers, over time. As is clear from Figure
62. See BAKER, supra note 45, at 77–83 (2005) (summarizing medical malpractice closed-claim
studies).
63. ABA STANDING COMM., 1990S PROFILE, supra note 49, at 12; ABA STANDING COMM.,
1986 STATISTICAL STUDY, supra note 46, at 64; ABA STANDING COMM., 1996–1999 PROFILE, supra
note 49, at 10; ABA STANDING COMM., 2000–2003 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 8; ABA STANDING
COMM., 2004–2007 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 9; ABA STANDING COMM., 2008–2011 PROFILE, supra
note 49, at 10.
64. The choice not to make an attempt to evaluate the merits of the claims may simply be a
question of resources. Closed-claim studies are expensive and time consuming. It is also possible that
the organized Bar is more prepared than organized Medicine to believe that the legal system does a
decent job of weeding out nonmeritorious claims and calibrating claim payments to reflect the
strength of the plaintiffs’ case.
65. BAKER, supra note 45, at 77–83; see also Tom Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Practice
Study Conclusions About the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 501 (2005)
(describing the flaws in the only closed-claim study to reach a contrary conclusion).
66. According to the U.S. Statistical Abstract, the number of employed lawyers and judges in
the U.S. grew from 547,000 in 1980 to 1.10 million in 2010. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND EARNINGS 402 tbl.675 (1981); U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND EARNINGS 394
tbl.615 (2011). The number of lawyers and judges was not reported separately for 1980. For 2010, the
number of employed lawyers was 1.04 million and the number of employed judges was 71,000.
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1, the distribution of the disposition of claims has been relatively stable over time.

Figure 1: Disposition of Claims
(from ABA Standing Committee)
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Table 1 and Figure 2 show the mix of claims by practice area and type of
alleged error over time.67 Both show stability among the share of claims
attributable to different practice areas and to general categories of errors.
Although Table 1 shows change in the distribution of claims attributable to
different practice areas, real estate, personal injury, family law, and trusts and
estates have consistently maintained the top four spots.

67. ABA STANDING COMM., 1986 STATISTICAL STUDY, supra note 46, at 6, 8; ABA
STANDING COMM., 1990S PROFILE, supra note 49, at 7, 14; ABA STANDING COMM., 1996–1999
PROFILE, supra note 49, at 5, 12; ABA STANDING COMM., 2000–2003 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 4, 9;
ABA STANDING COMM., 2004–2007 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 4, 7; ABA STANDING COMM., 2008–
2011 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 5, 9.
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Table 1
Percent of Claims by Practice Area (from ABA Standing Committee)
2011
2007
2003
1999
1995
1985
AREA OF LAW
%
%
%
%
%
%
Real Estate
20.3
20.1
16.5
17.0
14.4
23.3
Personal Injury - Plaintiff
15.6
21.6
20.0
24.6
21.7
25.1
Family Law
12.1
10.3
9.6
10.1
9.1
7.9
Estate, Trust and Probate
10.7
9.7
8.6
8.7
7.6
7.0
Collection and Bankruptcy
9.2
7.3
7.9
8.0
7.9
10.5
Corporate/Business Org.
6.8
4.9
6.4
8.6
8.9
5.3
Subtotal
74.7
73.8
68.9
76.9
69.5
79.0
Criminal
5.7
5.1
4.2
4.2
3.8
3.3
Business Trans.
4.1
4.7
3.2
3.6
10.7
3.0
Commercial
Personal Injury - Defense
3.3
2.9
10.0
4.1
3.3
3.2
Labor Law
2.2
1.4
1.6
2.2
1.4
0.7
Worker's Compensation
1.9
2.0
2.3
1.9
3.3
2.1
Patent, Trademark,
1.8
1.7
1.8
1.0
0.9
0.6
Copyright
Taxation
1.2
1.4
1.4
1.1
1.6
1.6
Civil Rights
0.8
1.1
1.7
1.1
0.6
1.1
Discrimination
Immigration/
0.8
0.5
0.4
0.5
0.2
0.1
Naturalization
Construction (Building
0.7
0.5
0.3
0.3
0.7
0.8
Contracts)
Local Government
0.7
1.0
0.6
0.4
0.7
0.7
Government
0.7
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.4
Contracts/Claims
Securities (S.E.C.)
0.6
0.9
1.8
1.5
1.9
2.0
Consumer Claims
0.4
0.3
1.2
0.4
0.3
0.7
Natural Resources
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.2
Environment Law
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.1
Admiralty
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.3
Antitrust
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
International Law
0.0
2.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
As shown in Figure 2, the rate of administrative and client-relations errors,
combined, is consistently about the same as that of substantive errors, with the
exception of the 1999 update, which found a higher substantive to administrative
error ratio.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Claims by Category of
Alleged Error (from ABA Standing Committee)
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This long-term stability in the distribution of errors by type and practice area
helps to explain the recent shift away from a focus on risk management in LPL
pricing in the small law firm market.68 Historically, the NABRICO firms (and
some commercial firms) priced, in significant part, on risk management. When
commercial insurers were pulling out of the market in the late 1970s and early
1980s, the first NABRICO companies took a different approach to providing
insurance. Rather than follow exactly in the footsteps of the withdrawing
commercial insurers, which had until that time been focused more on area of
practice and geography,69 these NABRICO companies decided to investigate the
“original cause” of the claims, determining whether the claim was “fortuitous, or
was there a cause of events that could have been prevented, and if so, what are the
practices that need to be laid in place to prevent that sort of claim from happening
in the future.”70 This instinct to investigate was part of what led to the initial ABA
68. The data from Figure 2 are reproduced below in Table 2 with additional granularity—the
major categories of errors and wrongs are broken into smaller units of analysis. The one notable area
of long-term decline is calendaring errors, which have declined from 11% of claims in the 1985 study
to 4% in the 2011 study. Conversely, one area of increase in the most recent study is lost files,
documents, or evidence, growing to over 7% from less than 1% in all of the previous studies.
69. Telephone Interview with Reinsurer 1, supra note 19 (“Prior to that study, underwriters
were, in my estimation, unduly focused on area practice.”).
70. Id.; see also Telephone Interview with CEO 1, supra note 15, explaining why he avoided
solo practitioners:
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Standing Committee study discussed above.
Table 2
Percent of Claims by Type of Alleged Error
(from ABA Standing Committee)
TYPE OF ACTIVITY
ADMINISTRATIVE ERRORS
Procrastination in Performance/
Follow-up
Lost File, Document Evidence
Failure to Calendar Properly
Clerical Error
Failure to File Document - No Deadline
Failure to React to Calendar
Subtotal
CLIENT RELATIONS ERRORS
Failure to Obtain Consent/
Inform Client
Failure to Follow Client's Instruction
Improper Withdrawal of Representation
Subtotal
Admin. + Client Errors Subtotal
SUBSTANTIVE ERRORS
Failure to Know/Properly Apply Law
Inadequate Discovery/Investigation
Planning Error - Procedure Choice
Failure to Know/Ascertain Deadline
Conflict of Interest
Error in Public Record Search
Failure Understand/Anticipate Tax
Error Mathematical Calculation
Subtotal
INTENTIONAL WRONGS
Fraud
Malicious Prosecution, Abuse of Process
Violation of Civil Rights
Libel or Slander
Subtotal
GRAND TOTAL

2011
%

2007
%

2003
%

1999
%

1995
%

1985
%

9.68

4.24

9.43

4.95

8.68

4.96

7.05
4.34
3.54
3.17
2.34
30.13

0.60
7.44
2.04
10.73
3.57
28.63

0.37
5.19
4.74
4.28
4.35
28.35

0.40
7.03
1.25
1.54
1.27
16.43

0.57
6.75
2.14
2.69
6.35
27.18

0.68
11.46
1.50
4.33
3.58
26.50

7.02

5.31

5.75

11.89

9.77

9.46

5.71
1.87
14.61
44.74

3.22
2.70
11.22
39.85

6.72
2.10
14.57
42.92

3.93
2.93
18.75
35.18

5.06
2.14
16.97
44.15

5.75
1.53
16.74
43.24

13.57
7.82
7.39
6.91
4.28
3.03
1.37
0.69
45.07

11.51
8.10
9.44
6.38
4.79
4.02
1.73
0.64
46.61

10.98
10.37
7.72
7.09
6.28
2.54
1.26
1.04
47.28

21.90
6.13
3.21
15.24
5.12
2.65
1.57
0.48
56.29

11.05
10.24
10.87
6.97
3.79
1.24
1.96
0.44
46.55

9.74
9.21
7.88
7.03
3.45
4.86
1.89
0.78
44.84

4.53
3.43
1.27
0.96
10.19
100.00

5.82
3.88
1.87
1.96
13.53
100.00

3.35
3.59
1.26
1.59
9.79
100.0

2.11
4.09
1.15
1.18
8.53
100.00

3.19
3.70
1.29
1.11
9.29
100.00

4.28
4.32
1.78
1.54
11.92
100.00

Today, pricing in the small firm market is formula driven with less emphasis
on risk management.71 Although different companies place emphases on different
Solo practitioners didn’t have the wherewithal to really manage, from a risk management
standpoint, a business in the kind of way that would be safe from claim activity. They
didn’t have the money. They would have insufficient calendaring systems. They would
have insufficient or inadequate conflict systems. They would have—they wouldn’t use
form letters with regard to engagement or disengagement. Small firms or sole practitioners
simply wouldn’t have the time, quite frankly, to focus on that type of thing and still trying
to eke out a living.
71. Telephone Interview with CEO 1, supra note 15:
Just a few years ago our pricing was based on kind of a test. Our application in essence was
a screening test to determine just how tight and how well-run your office was. We asked
questions about things like your docket control, your conflict system, your calendaring
system, your intake procedures, your engagement letters and depending upon how you
answered those, then we would score you. Depending upon what that score was, it equated
to a rate. We had like basically three different rating levels—good, bad and average, if you
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factors, there is a clear focus on the traditional factors of area of practice,
geography, and number of lawyers. That is not to say that risk management is
completely unimportant in pricing, it is just weighted less on pricing scales than it
may have once been. Although we do not have information to corroborate this
point, it may be that insurers believe that technological advances have made
administrative tasks such as calendaring and conflicts checking easier.
Alternatively, the relatively consistent distribution of claims by practice area and
type of error from 1980 to 2011 reflected in Table 1 and Figure 2 may have
convinced insurers that the adoption of easily observable risk management
practices by small law firms does not change their risk profiles very much.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the distribution of claims according to the amount
of the payment to the claimant and the amount of money spent on “expense” (i.e.
defense), respectively.72 As with the figures above, Figures 3, 4, and 5 show each
category of claim as a percentage of overall claims because the participating
insurers, the sample, and the methods of collecting data have changed over time
such that the data do not allow for a direct comparison of claims themselves.
Figures 3 and 4 are further complicated because the Standing Committee changed
the categories in which it reported claims by payment to claimants over time. Until
2007 the Committee reported $0 payment claims together with claims paid in
amounts up to $10,000 in a single category, thereby not permitting the separation
of paid and $0 payment claims. Thus, in order to make the results of the studies
comparable while retaining this important distinction, Figure 3 reports the 2007
and 2011 results with the $0 payment claims separate from and combined with the
$1 to $10,000 paid claims. In the 1985 study the category of “over $100,000” was
the largest category. Accordingly, Figure 3 reports the “over $100,000” category

will. We rated accordingly and then what we filed with the states reflected those scores and
that kind of philosophy. Today it’s much more driven by area practice and we typically
say—we ask questions now more tailored to, “How much do you do in a specific area of
law?” Based on the percentages that the applicant sends back, our rating model basically
does the math.
This change was corroborated by several other interviews. As one reinsurer stated:
We’re invisible in the whole process; at least we should be. The better the application, the
fewer questions we have to ask and that’s a good thing. Then the way we rate it and so
forth is pretty much similar to how everybody else does: number of attorneys;
modification for good claims or bad claims; modification for what they do from a risk
management perspective; reputational respect, those types of things. Modification for
where they’re operating: Those types of things, and then just their practice factor, so is it
all heavy plaintiff work or is it real basic estate work? Those types of things.
Telephone Interview with Reinsurer 2 (May 3, 2014). Similarly, an actuary we interviewed explained
that the top three items that make up the price are the number of attorneys, the state where the firm
practices, and the practice areas of the insureds. See Telephone Interview with Actuary 2 (Nov. 1,
2013); see also Telephone Interview with Underwriter 2, supra note 16 (explaining the entire rating
structure for credits and debits based, inter alia, on geography, area of practice, number of lawyers, and
loss).
72. ABA STANDING COMM., 1986 STATISTICAL STUDY, supra note 46, at 65; ABA STANDING
COMM., 1990S PROFILE, supra note 49, at 15; ABA STANDING COMM., 1996–1999 PROFILE, supra
note 49, at 16; ABA STANDING COMM., 2000–2003 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 13; ABA STANDING
COMM., 2004–2007 PROFILE, supra note 49, at 13; ABA STANDING COMM., 2008–2011 PROFILE,
supra note 49, at 14.
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for all years as well as separately breaking out the larger payment categories for the
follow up studies.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of indemnity payments made to claimants
even when the insurer paid nothing. Figure 4 shows the total number of claims in
each category as a percentage of the total number of claims paid. That is, Figure 4
displays the percentage of all claims paid for those years (2007 and 2011) that we
have the data distinguishing between paid and unpaid claims. All dollars are
nominal. Figure 5 expands the picture by showing the distribution of the expenses
paid, not just indemnity payments. In other words, Figure 5 takes account of other
claim expenses, like defense costs.

Figure 3: Distribution of All Indemnity Payments
(from ABA Standing Committee)
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Percentage of Paid Claims

Figure 4: Distribution of Indemnity Payments for
Actual Claims Paid
(from ABA Standing Committee)
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Figure 5: Distribution of Claims by Expenses Paid
(from ABA Standing Committee)
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The precise distribution reflected in Figures 3, 4, and 5 is less important than
the remarkable stability that is demonstrated. Figures 3, 4, and 5 reflect the usual
trend in liability claims generally, large numbers of small claims and increasingly
fewer claims at higher levels of payment and defense expense. Consistent with the
results shown in Figure 1 regarding disposition of claims, Figure 3 shows that
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there is a very high percentage of $0 claims in the two studies for which those
claims were separately reported (2007 and 2011). Figure 5 shows that the
percentage of claims with zero or de minimis expense payment (less than $1000) is
consistently high across all of the studies, strongly suggesting that a substantial
majority of the claims reported to insurers never pose a realistic threat of
liability.73 Very few claims in the ABA studies result in payments of $1 million or
more, and a substantial number of those may well represent payments by CNA,
Zurich, or other commercial insurers on behalf of larger law firms.
The ABA Standing Committee reports show significant stability over time in
a number of areas. First, over time, and as found in most closed-claims studies,
the majority of claims brought are either dismissed in favor of the defendants or
abandoned. Second, over time, about 45% of all claims are brought as a result of
either defendants’ administrative errors or client-relationship errors. The
remainder is the result of substantive legal errors. Third, the data show significant
stability in the distribution of indemnity and overall claim payments.
That said, the conclusions to be drawn from these data might be quite
limited. First, the Standing Committee studies do not provide much that is useful
regarding medium to large law firms. This is not a criticism of the Standing
Committee. Rather, it is the inevitable result of the fact that, with the exception of
five years of data provided by ALAS for the 1995 study, none of the large law
firm mutual insurers provided data to the Standing Committee, nor, with the
significant exception of CNA and Zurich, did many of the commercial insurance
companies that insure larger law firms. Further, in the solo- and small-firm
market, a significant percentage of lawyers may be uninsured. As such, even if the
sample is representative of insured lawyers practicing in small or solo firms, the
findings may not be generalizable to all lawyers practicing in that market.
Moreover, the data we present here are limited to the survey responses solicited
and reported from insurers. We do not have detailed claims studies from which to
draw more precise conclusions.
Despite these limitations, the Standing Committee reports are important in
light of the sway they held in the formation of the LPL market.74 Further, these
are the best publicly available data and, as such, present, at least a reasonable
window into claims and claiming against small and solo firms.
B. ALAS Annual Reports as a Window on Larger Firm Liability
As limited as the Standing Committee findings are, at least there has been
some organized effort to collect data about the small and solo firms. There are no
corresponding publicly available data that aggregate the claims records of the
insurers of medium and large law firms. The large law firm mutual insurers are
73. The high rate of nonserious claims likely results in part from the strict notice reporting
requirements in LPL insurance policies, pursuant to which law firms that delay reporting claims face a
substantial risk of losing coverage for the claim. See BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 1, at 454–69
(discussing insurance liability cases).
74. See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text.
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notoriously and understandably secretive, with the partial exception of ALAS,
which insures a sufficiently large number of firms that it can release some data in
a manner that does not expose its members. The Minet brokerage firm, acquired
by Aon in 1997, has for many years represented a large percentage of the large law
firm market, but it derives a competitive advantage from its resulting access to
claims-related information that we expect that it would be reluctant to give up.
As a result, the only publicly available large law firm claims numbers are
those contained in the annual reports of ALAS. Those reports have never been
systematically collected and analyzed in a public forum. With considerable effort,
we have obtained all of the ALAS Annual Reports, from the first report issued in
1981 through the most recent report issued in 2014. These reports contain
information about premiums, limits, self-insured retentions, and claims in addition
to financial information about ALAS and a complete listing of member law firms.
Ours is the first published effort to compile and use the data from these reports as
a window on large law firm liability.
ALAS has long been the single largest insurer of medium to large law firms
in the United States. A more complete description of ALAS awaits future work.
For present purposes what matters most are the ways in which ALAS members
are, and are not, representative of U.S. law firms.
The first important difference is size. ALAS members are much larger than
the vast majority of U.S. law firms. This first difference is part of what makes the
ALAS data such a useful complement to the ABA Standing Committee studies.
ALAS members are a sample—admittedly a convenience sample—of the
population of law firms that is most underrepresented in the ABA Standing
Committee data. A firm must have at least thirty-five lawyers to be eligible for
membership in ALAS, and most ALAS member firms are considerably larger.75
Of the 224 member firms listed in the 2013 ALAS annual report, seventy-seven
are in the 2014 AmLaw 200, which is a listing prepared by American Law Media
of the 200 largest law firms as determined by annual revenues.76 Twenty-eight of
the ALAS member firms are in the AmLaw 100.77
A second important difference is geography. For many years, ALAS did not
permit firms based in New York City to join, and it placed significant restrictions
on law firms based in California, thereby excluding an important segment of the
medium- to large-law-firm population.78 The current ALAS membership reflects
75. See ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2000)
(noting that ALAS required firms to have thirty-five or more practicing attorneys).
76. Compare Revenue Growth Strengthens, AM. LAW.: THE HAVES AND HAVE-NOTS, June 2013,
at 75, 75–76; and A New Number One, AM. LAW., supra note 11, at 137, 137, 139–42, with 2013 ALAS
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 79–83. We determined the number of ALAS members in the
AmLaw 200 by comparing the list in this issue of the American Lawyer to the list of ALAS members
in the 2013 Annual Report.
77. 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6; A New Number One, AM. LAW., supra note 11,
at 137, 137–38. We determined the number of ALAS members in the AmLaw 100 by comparing the
list in this issue of the American Lawyer to the list of ALAS members in the 2013 Annual Report.
78. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting that ALAS originally excluded firms from
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this historic practice. The ALAS member firms listed in the 2013 annual report do
not include any truly large firms based in New York City, San Francisco, or Los
Angeles, in marked contrast to firms based in Chicago, DC, Boston, and
Philadelphia.79 In part as a result of this historic practice, the large New York City
firms and many of the large California firms formed their own mutual insurance
arrangements, which we described above. This difference means that what can be
learned from the ALAS convenience sample may not be generalizable to the large
New York City and California law firm experience.
A third important difference relates to the ALAS commitment to loss
prevention and claims management. ALAS requires its members to make a
significant commitment to ALAS-mediated risk and claim management
practices.80 This requirement likely produces some selection bias: law firms that
find this requirement congenial and law firms that find it unacceptable are likely
to differ from one another in ways that may impact their LPL-claims profiles. The
requirement may also result in different patterns of liability among ALAS member
firms that are otherwise similar to nonmember firms. If this difference makes a
difference, then the frequency and severity of claims within the ALAS
convenience sample should be less than prevails outside that sample.
Despite these very significant limitations on the generalizability of what can
be learned from ALAS data, there are good reasons to believe that the results of
the analysis do provide useful information for the medium- to large-law-firm
market generally. The LPL insurance market appears to be a competitive one. It
appears that at least some commercial carriers look at the ALAS rates in setting
their own.81 Our law firm, broker, and commercial insurance company
respondents also all reported that brokers and commercial LPL insurers regularly
attempt to persuade ALAS members to leave ALAS and move to the commercial
market.82 Further, our respondents reported that ALAS is open to new
members.83 For these reasons we conclude that ALAS pricing (and, thus, by
that had their principal office in New York City).
79. 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 79–83.
80. See, e.g., 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 17–20, 25–26 (detailing ALAS’s
loss-prevention services and policy of remedial actions for firms that do not meet its requirements).
81. See Telephone Interview with Executive 3, supra note 28:
I mean, again, we started out with the ALAS rates. It’s kind of like the beginning
benchmark when we started underwriting, and saying, “Okay, look, if it’s an average firm
across the board—and an average firm, of course, will have some claims because ALAS
certainly does have claims—they’ll have some claims activity that’ll creep up above the
retention sometimes, and we’ll take a look at that.”
82. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Broker 5 (Nov. 7, 2013) (“We would always do sort of a
competitive analysis, not on financial security necessarily, but really on pricing volatility type issues, so
that we could talk to members of ALAS about putting them into the commercial market or helping
them understand the difference.”); Telephone Interview with Law Firm General Counsel 12 (July 13,
2014) (“I think there is—one of the arguments that commercial carriers make—we get solicited a fair
amount—is, ‘If you come with us, you’re going to pay X dollars a lawyer, and that’s Y dollars less
than what you’re paying at ALAS.’”).
83. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Law Firm General Counsel 4 (May 9, 2013) (“Q: Have
you ever considered being part of ALAS? R: Yes, we were—we talked to ALAS a number of times
and we actually were invited to join ALAS a couple years ago. I have very close relationships with the
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operation of arithmetic, ALAS claims experience) cannot over the long term
diverge too sharply from the commercial market. If ALAS long-term prices were
much lower than the commercial market, then more law firms would be
attempting to join. If ALAS long-term prices were much higher than the
commercial market, then ALAS would be unable to maintain its membership.
How much is “too much” is a subject for additional research. For present
purposes the ALAS data that we report are sufficiently likely to be at least
directionally informative about large law firm liability generally to justify the effort
involved in compilation and analysis.
Unlike the Standing Committee studies, the ALAS data allow us to reach
conclusions about lawyers professional liability and insurance within a population
of firms over time—ALAS member firms. For all years since 1983 the ALAS
annual reports contain the following claim related information in a manner that is
sufficiently consistent to permit comparison over time: the cumulative number of
“real claims” reported by members per calendar year (defined as “all claims other
that those initially classified as without merit”),84 the number of real claims
reported per one thousand lawyers per year, the number of claims reported per
calendar year by area of practice, and the cumulative gross incurred loss per
calendar year by area of practice. Figures 6 through 9 on the following pages
present some of the highlights of the ALAS claims data in simple chart form.
Figure 6 shows the number of real claims per one thousand lawyers reported
to ALAS each year from 1983 to 2013. Apart from a sharp uptick in the first two
years (which is likely to be the result of a transition in claims reporting as ALAS
members shifted from reporting their claims to their prior insurers under older,
occurrence-based coverage to ALAS, rather than a sharp increase in claims
brought against ALAS members) and a peak in the very early 1990s, the long-term
trend is a slow decline, from a peak of 11.4 real claims per one thousand lawyers
in 1991 to 7.5 real claims per one thousand lawyers in 2013. To the extent that
these numbers can be extrapolated to large law firms generally, this gradual
decline suggests that the large growth in the number of lawyers practicing in large
law firms in the United States since the early 1990s has not been accompanied by
a corresponding growth in the number of LPL claims brought against lawyers
practicing in large law firms.85 Whether this reflects instantiation of norms of
professional conduct, better risk management, the difficulty of bringing these
claims, or something else is indiscernible from this data.

people at ALAS.”).
84. See, e.g., 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 11.
85. See generally Aric Press, Big Law’s Reality Check, AM. LAW., Nov. 2014, at 40, 43–44.

1304

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:273

Figure 6: Real Claims per 1000 Lawyers
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Figure 7 shows the distribution of total claims filed each year by practice area.86 In
this chart the gray scale areas that appear from bottom to top in the chart
86. ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1984 ANNUAL REPORT (1984);
ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1985 ANNUAL REPORT (1985); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB.
ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1986 ANNUAL REPORT (1987); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y
LTD., 1988 ANNUAL REPORT (1989); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1989 ANNUAL
REPORT (1990); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1990 ANNUAL REPORT (1991);
ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT (1992); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB.
ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT (1993); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y
LTD., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT (1994); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1995 ANNUAL
REPORT (1996) ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT (1997);
ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1998); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB.
ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT (1999); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y
LTD., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT (2000); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2000 ANNUAL
REPORT (2001); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (2002);
ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT (2003); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB.
ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT (2004); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y
LTD., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT (2005); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2005 ANNUAL
REPORT (2006); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT (2007);
ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT (2008); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB.
ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT (2009); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y
LTD., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2010); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT (2011); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT (2012);
ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT (2013); ATTORNEYS’ LIAB.
ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT (2014).
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correspond to the gray scale legend at the bottom, running from left to right. For
example, the bottom area of the chart shows the percent of claims in the
corporate/banking practice area, and the top area of the chart shows the percent
of claims in all practice areas other than those specifically listed.
There is one important caveat about the data shown in Figure 7. ALAS
provides only cumulative data about the number of claims filed; ALAS does not
provide the total number of claims per practice on an annual basis. That is, ALAS
provides only the total number of claims per practice area from the beginning of
ALAS to the current reporting period.87 Our attempts to calculate marginal yearly
data—by simply subtracting one year from the next—yielded odd results. For
example, in several years, across several different practice areas, the annualized per
claim numbers were negative. This may be because ALAS reclassified a claim
from a real claim to a frivolous claim, reclassified a claim from one area of
practice to another, or some other unknown reason. Because of these strange
results, we present only the cumulative data. Further, because the number of
lawyers insured affects the number of cumulative claims, we present only the
distribution of the cumulative claims.
One problem with the cumulative—as opposed to annualized—data is that
the chart is not very sensitive to yearly changes in the distribution of claims. Even
if the number of litigation claims spiked over a couple of year period, the figure
would not reflect that trend with a similar spike. In other words, the right hand
side of the chart is not particularly sensitive to annual changes in the number of
claims in a given practice area because the annual change is not likely enough to
change the cumulative distribution of claims. Figure 7 might nonetheless be useful
as a holistic picture of the market and of the way insurers might consider the risks
presented.
Litigation is the practice area with the largest number of claims, with
corporate/banking in second place, followed at some distance by trusts and
estates, real estate, and securities. (Corporate and banking are lumped together
because ALAS did not report them separately until 1991.) ALAS does not report
the number of lawyers practicing in these areas, and we were unable to obtain
historical practice area information for ALAS member firms, so we do not have a
way to assess whether the rate of claims per lawyer varies across those practice
groups. Our sense is that corporate and litigation practice groups are the largest
practice groups in most large law firms, so the higher frequency of claims in those
practice areas likely reflects the number of lawyers involved rather than a higher
per lawyer frequency risk.

87. In 1995, ALAS did not report cumulative claims. Rather ALAS reported the percentage of
cumulative claims per practice area as we have done in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Percent of Cumulative
Claims By Practice Area
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Figure 8 shows the distribution of cumulative gross loss for each year by the
same practice areas,88 and it should be read with the same caveat and in the same
manner as Figure 7. Importantly, gross loss is not the same as claims paid data.
Gross loss is a measure of the cost of claims to ALAS. That cost includes both
actual claim-related payments as of the date of the reporting and the reserves
ALAS put aside as an estimate of the future expenses for that claim.89 Given that
part of the cost of claims—the reserves—are an estimate, the actual cost of a
given claim might change from year to year. For this reason, the data reported by
ALAS on cumulative gross loss are also not amenable to modification to
annualized losses. The result, again, is that the data for 2013, for instance, includes

88. See sources cited supra note 86.
89. 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 11 (“This metric comprises the expected
ultimate cost of claims reported in the current underwriting period plus any change in projected
ultimate claim costs related to prior underwriting periods, without taking reinsurance into account. It
also includes ALAS’s internal expenses for claims management and loss prevention services.”).
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all of the losses for each category from 1987 to 2013. Thus, the distribution across
categories is less likely to change significantly on the right hand side of the chart.
Even really big payouts in a given category may be a drop in the bucket compared
to the cumulative effects of payments over twenty-five years.
That said, the data are again useful for seeing a holistic picture of the losses.
The corporate/banking practice area consistently has the largest share—close to
50% in all years after 1989—followed by securities in the early years and litigation
thereafter. As a comparison of Figures 7 and 8 reveals, litigation has always been
responsible for a much larger percentage of total claims than total losses.

100%

Figure 8: Percent of Cumulative Gross Loss By
Practice Area
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Table 3 presents the cumulative ALAS claims and loss data, confirming that
litigation claims are much less expensive than corporate and banking claims.90 The
area of practice with the largest average per claim severity is securities ($1.42M)
followed by banking ($1.12M). The lowest average per claim severity is for
litigation claims at only $165,300. All of these averages include defense costs,

90. 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 12. We consolidated certain practice areas
for this table, including Administrative law, Bankruptcy, Divorce/Family Law, and Labor/
Employment into the Other category. We display claims deriving from Tax/ERISA practice areas in
Table 3, but not in Figures 7 and 8, because ALAS did not report data on those practice areas
throughout the sample. Conversely, we broke out Corporate and Banking practice areas because
ALAS has tracked those areas separately since 1991.
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which count as part of the insured loss in the ALAS standard policy.91
Importantly, these averages do not include payments by the law firms themselves
to satisfy their retentions before ALAS makes payments, nor do they include
payments by excess insurers for those (very few) claims that exceed the limit of
the ALAS coverage. Thus, the total average loss per claim in each practice area is
larger. How much larger is impossible to say without taking these retentions and
excess insurer payments into account.
Table 3

Securities

Cumulative Claims and Loss By Practice Area (1983-2013)
% of All Mean Gross
% of all
Gross Loss
Number
ALAS
Loss per
ALAS
(000s
of
Gross
Claim (000s
Claims
Omitted)
Claims
Loss
Omitted)
522
4%
$747,800
13%
$1,432.6

Banking
Patent/Trademark/
Copyright
Corporate

262

2%

$294,600

5%

$1,124.4

386

3%

$255,400

5%

$661.7

Tax/ERISA

3627

26%

$2,302,900

41%

$634.9

564

4%

$303,300

5%

$537.8

Real Estate

952

7%

$312,100

6%

$327.8

Trusts & Estates

949

7%

$208,700

4%

$219.9

Other

1254

9%

$245,000

5%

$195.4

Litigation

5334

39%

$881,700

16%

$165.3

ALAS began reporting information about law firm retentions in 1998 in a
manner that is informative but does not permit a straightforward calculation of
the total loss associated with ALAS claims, either in the aggregate or on a practice
area basis. Figure 9 shows the average per claim retention for lawyers in ALAS
member law firms.92 The dark line shows the average per claim retention in
nominal dollars. The shaded line uses the Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer
Pricing Index for legal services to control for inflation.93 As Figure 9 shows,
average per claim retentions were just under $800,000 in 1997 and grew to $1.4
million in 2013. In real terms the average per lawyer retention has remained
constant over the entire period of the available data.
91. See ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 9–10 (2012)
(noting that gross claims expense is the expected ultimate costs of claims reported and includes
actuarial predictions, reserves, and internal expenses); see also ATTORNEY’S LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y
LTD., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1992) (noting that this number does not include expenses by
member firms or within their retentions and giving an example of that amount for 1991).
92. We used a three-year trailing average because of an anomaly in the way that the data were
reported for policies issued in 2000 and 2001.
93. The PPI numbers for legal services are tracked under number 5411 and provide an annual
and monthly index from 1996 to the present. The data can be accessed using the industry number
through the Bureau of Labor Statistics website.
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If we make the reasonable assumption that larger law firms have higher
retentions and more severe claims, it follows that it is not possible simply to add
the average retention amount to ALAS’s average gross incurred loss in order to
arrive at the average total incurred loss. Moreover, there are no publicly available
data regarding the frequency or amount of payments made in excess of ALAS
limits. Thus, all that can be said about the average gross loss per claim numbers is
that they understate, perhaps substantially, the total defense and indemnity
payments on an average claim.

Figure 9: Three-Year Average Retention per Year
(in thousands of $)
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Figures 10 and 11 show ALAS per member LPL costs over time using two
different metrics. The figures show the costs in nominal dollars in the dark black
line and, for years beginning in 1997 (when the Bureau of Labor Statistics began
tracking the producer price index for legal expenses) also in inflation-adjusted
dollars in the thinner grey line.
Figure 10 shows the annual per lawyer change in cumulative gross loss.94
This measure of per lawyer LPL cost is computed by dividing the total number of
lawyers in ALAS member firms during each year into the change in cumulative
gross loss from the prior year. This metric is much less stable because it is strongly
affected by year-to-year changes in reserves, which are based upon judgments that
can change rapidly and typically do so over the course of the underwriting cycle.95
As shown in Figure 10, this LPL cost metric follows the pattern of the liability
insurance underwriting cycle that is familiar from work on medical malpractice
94.
95.

See sources cited supra note 86.
Baker, supra note 7, at 398–99.

1310

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:273

liability insurance, with the difference that, in addition to the rapid increases in
gross loss during the mid 1980s and early 2000s, there was also a rapid increase in
gross loss in the early 1990s. This latter increase may be attributable to the early
1990s peak in real claims per one thousand lawyers shown in Figure 1 (which did
not occur in medical liability)
Figure 11 shows the average per lawyer rate ALAS charges each year for an
LPL insurance policy with a $20 million per claim and a $40 million annual
aggregate limit, one of the kinds of insurance policies that ALAS has offered to its
members every year since inception.96 The per lawyer rate for these twenty/forty
policies differs according to the SIR; policies with higher SIRs have lower
premiums. We show the average rate for all of the twenty/forty SIR combinations
that have been consistently offered by ALAS. This rate is computed by averaging
the rates ALAS offered for the $100,000, $250,000, and $500,000 retention levels
at the $20/$40 million limit level from 1982 to 2013. In unreported work we have
verified that the same general pattern of changes in rates over time holds true
across all of the ALAS insurance policies. We present the average rate for the
twenty/forty policies because a chart with a single line is easier to interpret than
one with multiple lines. The figure follows the familiar pattern of the liability
insurance underwriting cycle. For example, the rise in premiums in the early 1980’s
reflects one of the most significant hard markets in liability insurance. The one
difference, once again, is that there was also a rapid increase in premiums in the
early 1990s.

96.

See sources cited supra note 86.
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Figure 10: Change in Gross Loss per Year per
Lawyer (in thousands of $)
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Figure 11: Average Per Lawyer Premium for
$20M/$40M Per Year (in thousands of $)
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ALAS does not report claims disposition rates in a manner that is similar to
the Standing Committee reports, so it is not possible to determine how the
disposition rates of claims reported by ALAS members compare to those reported
in the Standing Committee studies. The only dispositions that ALAS reports are
trial results. Since its inception in the late 1970s ALAS has litigated to trial just 218
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claims. In those cases, ALAS reports that it received a defense verdict in 153 cases
and a reversal of a plaintiff’s verdict on appeal in another 17.97 This is a defendant
trial success rate of 72% (similar to that in medical malpractice cases) and an
overall adjudicatory success rate of 81%, suggesting that ALAS is making good
judgments about which cases to take to trial.98
ALAS does not report its claims according to the type of error or activity
categories employed by the Standing Committee. Nevertheless some insights can
be gleaned from the narratives in the claims management section of the annual
reports. First, while ALAS does not publicly report claims by type of error or
activity, it appears that, like other entities engaged in large law firm risk
management, ALAS divides claims into three categories: “mistakes,” “conflicts of
interest,” and “poor client quality.”99 Second, consistent with the findings of the
Standing Committee, these “issues . . . cut across all practice areas and geographic
locations . . . .”100 For insight into how those categories map on to major claims
we turn next to summary data on large verdicts and settlements compiled by the
leading LPL insurance brokerage firm.
C. The Aon Summary of Large Verdicts and Settlements
Providing some insight into the breakdown between these categories of
major claims, Aon loss prevention specialist and insurance law scholar Douglas
Richmond has released a brief analysis of the largest publicly reported LPL
verdicts and settlements since the mid 1980’s, sixty-four of which exceed $20
million and twenty-eight of which exceed $35 million.101 The top two are a $108
million settlement in 2004 and a $103 million verdict in 2010.102 While there is no
comprehensive database that would allow us to determine how many additional
settlements there are that are greater than $20 million and not included in his
survey, our respondents suggest, “[t]hese sorts of debacles are hard to keep quiet,”
and, thus, Richmond likely has identified most of the very large claims
payments.103

97. See 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 11.
98. BAKER, supra note 45, at 74 (reporting a defense trial success rate of 70%).
99. See, e.g., ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2009)
[hereinafter 2008 ALAS Annual Report]; 2013 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.
100. 2008 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 10; see also 2013 ALAS ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 6, at 12:
As noted in the Leadership Letter, our firms continue to confront challenging economic
and financial pressures that can affect the behavior of lawyers in their practices, often
leading to mistakes, conflicts of interest, the representation of unworthy clients, or other
conduct that can cause serious claims. These issues have always been at the heart of our
major claims, and they are not confined to particular types or sizes of firms or specific
practice areas.
101. DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, THE LAW FIRM LIABILITY TERRAIN: PUBLICLY REPORTED
SETTLEMENTS AND VERDICTS (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
tips/webinars/LawFirmLiabilityTerrainRichmond.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN97-XMZ5].
102. Id. at 1.
103. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Broker 8 (Sept. 25, 2013) (“These sorts of debacles are
hard to keep quiet.”).
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Richmond reports the following breakdown among these very large claims:
 Forty-one attributable to dishonest clients
 Eleven attributable to conflicts of interest
 Three attributable to mistakes
 Three attributable to a combination of a dishonest client and a
conflict of interest
 Two attributable to malicious prosecution
 One attributable to a mistake coupled with a conflict of interest
 One attributable to a dishonest client and a mistake in an extended
representation of a client
 One attributable to a firm’s dishonesty (Milberg LLP’s payment of
secret fees to class action plaintiffs)
 One attributable to a lawyer’s dishonesty (the O’Quinn Law Firm’s
settlement of allegations that it over-charged clients for expenses in
a breast implant class action)104
In our judgment, Richmond’s “dishonest client” category likely matches up
reasonably well to ALAS’s “poor client quality” category, with the recognition that
“dishonest client” appears to be a deliberately provocative label for a category that
likely also includes honest clients in financial trouble.
Richmond also tracks settlements and verdicts in the $3 to $20 million range,
“with the $3 million floor being significant because it exceeds all but the very
largest law firms’ self-insured retentions.”105 Perhaps because of the smaller size
of the cases, there is less publicly available information about them (though
certainly there is much nonpublic information available to Aon in light of its very
substantial role in the LPL market). Richmond reports that such cases are
“numerous,” and categorizes an unspecified set of “recent cases” of this size as
follows:
 Thirty-three attributable to mistakes
 Seventeen attributable to dishonest clients
 Thirteen attributable to conflicts of interest
 Three attributable to malicious prosecution
 One attributable to fraud106
He reports that “the $3-20 million claims are believed to be representative of
matters within the range” even though “they are not all-inclusive.”107
Commenting on these cases, he observes:
What is perhaps most interesting about the settlements and verdicts in
the $3-20 million range is the prevalence of mistakes as the cause of loss,
which distinguishes cases of this size from those exceeding $20 million.
There probably are two reasons for this. First, the cases in the $3-20
104.
105.
106.
107.

RICHMOND, supra note 101.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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million range include a number of matters involving small law firms.
Because lawyers in small firms often do not work in teams in the same
way that their counterparts at large law firms do, there is a greater
likelihood that mistakes will escape notice until they allegedly harm
clients. Lawyers working in teams in large law firms tend to catch
mistakes before work gets out the door. Second, dishonest client claims
and conflict of interest allegations often put “heat” in cases, thus driving
up settlement and verdict value, while simple negligence rarely is an
aggravating factor. Thus, it is logical that most of the largest settlements
and verdicts would be rooted in allegations of dishonesty and conflicts of
interest.108
CONCLUSION
This review of the available quantitative data on the past thirty years of
experience in lawyers’ professional liability shows a pattern of relative stability and,
if the ALAS experience can be generalized, a decline in the real cost of lawyers’
liability on a per lawyer basis. As discussed above, there are reasons to doubt the
generalizability of the data. Both the ABA Standing Committee study and the
ALAS data are a convenience sample that may not be representative of insured
lawyers, let alone lawyers more generally. Nonetheless, these are the best data
publicly available.
Unlike medical liability, researchers studying legal professional liability do not
have other significant publicly available data. In the medical liability context,
researchers have (1) the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), tracking all
payments made by or on behalf of physicians in the United States;109 (2) The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) financial database,
which reports medical liability losses separately;110 and (3) closed-claim records of
medical liability in individual states like Texas, Florida, Missouri, and Illinois.111
108. Id.
109. See About Us, NAT’L PRAC. DATA BANK, http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/topNavigation/
aboutUs.jsp [https://web.archive.org/web/20150210035943/http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/topNavigation/
aboutUs.jsp] (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (“[NPDB] is a confidential information clearinghouse created
by Congress with the primary goals of improving health care quality, protecting the public, and
reducing health care fraud and abuse in the U.S.”). For an example of how these data have been used
by medical liability researchers, see Myungho Paik et al., The Receding Tide of Medical Malpractice
Litigation: Part 1—National Trends, 10 J. EMP. STUD. 612 (2013).
110. See generally Baker, supra note 7 (using NAIC’s separately reported medical liability
financial data to study changing costs of medical liability over time). Legal liability losses are reported
as part of the category of “other liability claims made,” which includes the much larger Directors and
Officers Liability Insurance line as well as all other professional liability except medical liability.
111. See, e.g., TEXAS DEP’T OF INS., THE 2012 TEXAS LIABILITY INSURANCE CLOSED CLAIM
ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2014), http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/pc/documents/taccar2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5J2-7KCU] (indicating that the closed-claim reports are required to identify
claims according to the following categories: “General Liability; Medical Professional Liability; Other
Professional Liability; Commercial Automobile Liability; The Liability Portion of Commercial MultiPeril Insurance”). For an example where these data have been used by medical liability researchers,
see Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988–2002, J.
EMP. LEG. STUD. 207 (2005).
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To be sure, each of these sources is flawed in its own right. For example,
there are serious concerns that the exclusion of claims made by or on behalf of
hospitals and other institutional medical providers means that the NPDB does not
include all claims.112 Further, there are serious concerns that the NAIC data
under-count medical liability losses because of the large number of alternative risk
transfer mechanisms, especially for hospitals and other large collections of medical
providers.113 And, there are concerns about the generalizability of conclusions
based upon a single state.114 But, especially when considered together, these
sources provide a significant window into medical liability. With these data in
hand researchers can make estimates and reach judgments about the overall
population of medical liability claims that simply cannot be made about lawyers’
liability.
Perhaps it is impossible to hope for such data in the LPL context. The
NAIC data on medical liability, for example, is a reasonable sample because
physicians have legal and other institutional requirements that obligate them in
most cases to be insured,115 a situation that we know does not correspond to
lawyers, especially those in solo- and very small-firm practice. More importantly,
there is likely little political will to create closed-claims records in the LPL context.
All of the public sources of medical liability data are a side effect of the political
struggle on the part of the medical profession to escape from medical liability. As
part of this struggle, advocates for the medical profession made assertions about
the extent and cost of medical liability in relation to the underlying rate of medical
malpractice that researchers acting on behalf of the profession attempted to back
up through empirical research.116 The political struggle took the medical
profession into legislatures, where advocates asked for relief from the usual tort
law rules that governed all of the other professions. In that process, the
legislatures passed laws that required medical liability insurers and others to
provide data to the government about medical liability losses.117
That political struggle never took place for the legal profession. Perhaps
because the legal profession regards lawyers’ liability as just one more form of selfregulation by the profession, the organized bar has never mounted the kind of

112. Tom Baker, Transparency Through Insurance: Mandates Dominate Discretion, in
CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 184, 191 ( Joseph
Doherty et al. eds., 2012).
113. Id. at 190.
114. See, e.g., Tom Baker et al., Everything’s Bigger in Texas Except the Medmal Settlements, 21
CONN. INS. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (questioning generalizability of some of the results using Texas
Department of Insurance claims data).
115. MICHELLE M. MELLO, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A
PRIMER 1 (2006), https://folio.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/10244/517/no8_primer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z4FS-YVYU] (“Nearly all states require that physicians have liability insurance.
Even in states that don’t, physicians usually have to have insurance coverage in order to get privileges
to see patients at a hospital.”).
116. BAKER, supra note 45, at 25–30 (describing origins of mid 1970s California and early
1980s New York hospital record studies).
117. Baker, supra note 112, at 197–98.
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challenge to lawyers’ liability that the medical profession mounted to challenge
medical liability. Thus, there have been no legislative demands for legal liability
reform that have led the way to the kind of mandatory reporting that exists for
medical liability.
This makes the quantitative study of legal malpractice difficult, at best. There
is little we can say conclusively from the data even about how many claims are
brought and settled, let alone the merits of the claims and the impact of the claims
on the practice of law. This means that, even more so than for medical liability,
understanding the nature and extent of lawyers’ liability requires going out into the
field.
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